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I. INTRODUCTION
The Warsaw Convention, officially known as the Conven-
tion for Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air,1 was enacted to support the world's fi-
nancially debilitated airline industry. 2 Before the Warsaw Con-
* J.D. Pace University School of Law, 2005; B.A. St. Thomas Aquinas College
- 1999. I would like to thank PILR, Josephine DiCosmo; my family, Anthony, Di-
ana, and Mel DiGiacomo, and my fianc6, George Hart, Jr. whose support made this
comment possible.
1 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 state. 3000, T.S. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11,
reprinted in 449 U.S.C. 1502 (1998) [hereinafter Warsaw Convention].
2 See Kelly Compton Grems, Punitive Damages under the Warsaw Conven-
tion: Revisiting the Drafters' Intent, 41 AM. U.L. REV. 141, 145 (Fall, 1991).
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vention, airlines were potentially liable, without monetary
limits, for all passenger claims arising from injury or baggage
loss. 3 One goal of this Convention was to promote growth of the
airlines by limiting their potential liability for passenger inju-
ries or deaths. 4 The origin of airline liability is found in Article
17 of the Warsaw Convention, which holds an airline liable for
damages resulting from the injury or death of a passenger. 5 Ar-
ticle 17 holds airlines only liable for accidents, meaning not all
injuries occurring on a flight will result in a violation of the
Convention.6 However, the Convention did not define the term
"accident."7 Because the Warsaw Convention was originally
drafted in French, "the French meaning of specific provisions
frequently leaves Anglophone judges unsure of the drafter's
intent.""
The paramount case in this area is Air France v. Saks.9
There, the Supreme Court relied on the French meaning of "ac-
cident."1° In French, the term "accident" when used to describe
a cause of injury is defined as an "unexpected," "unusual," or
"unintended" event."' The Supreme Court adopted this defini-
tion,12 adding that the accident had to be external to the pas-
senger.13 Courts have struggled with the scope of the definition
of "accident" since this leading case.' 4 The U.S. Circuit courts
3 See id.
4 See id.
5 See id. at 147.
6 See Davis L. Wright, Flying Over Friendly Skies: Expanding the Definition
of an "Accident" under the Warsaw Convention to Include Co-passenger Sexual As-
saults, 46 VILL. L. REV. 453, 459 (2001).
7 See Judith R. Karp, Mile High Assaults: Air Carrier Liability under theWarsaw Convention, 66 J. AIR L. & COM. 1551, 1557 (Fall, 2001).
8 Robert Coleman, I Saw Her Duck: Does Article 17 of the Warsaw Conven-
tion "Cover" Injuries or Accidents?, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 191, 191-194 (Fall,
1998).
9 Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985).
10 See Karp, supra note 7.
11 See id.
12 See id.
13 See Wright, supra note 6, at 460.
14 See Ann Cornett, Air Carrier Liability under Warsaw: The Ninth Circuit
Holds That an Aircraft Personnel's Failure to Act in the Face of a Known Risk Is an
"Accident" When Determining Warsaw Liability- Husain v. Olympic Airways, 68 J.
AIR L. & COM. 163, 163 (Winter 2003).
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are currently split over the question of the scope of Article 17's
coverage.'15
The Supreme Court in Saks made it clear that "there was
not an 'accident' if the injuries result from a passenger's own
internal reaction to the usual, normal, and excepted operation
of the aircraft.' 6 There has been a definite trend in liberalizing
the definition of the term "accident" under Article 17.17 The
courts have repeatedly allowed an expansion of the term "acci-
dent" to include, among other things, injuries due to co-passen-
ger sexual assaults, assaults involving an intoxicated
passenger,' 8 and deaths due to Deep Vein Thrombophlebitis
(DVT).' 9
However, there are still questions regarding an airline's po-
tential liability resulting from the airline aggravating or caus-
ing an injury to a passenger through its action or inaction.
20
The Supreme Court now has an opportunity to answer this
question,21 as well as re-examine the scope of the term "acci-
dent" under Article 17, which it adopted in Air France v. Saks.
2 2
In Husain v. Olympic Airways,23 a man died from a fatal
asthma attack after repeated requests from his wife to the crew
to move her husband out of the smoking section. 24 The District
Court held that the flight crew's failure to move Husain's seat
due to a known medical condition was an "accident" under Arti-
15 See Coleman, supra note 8, at 193.
16 Karp, supra note 7 (citing Saks, 470 U.S. at 406).
17 See David E. Prewitt, Cramped Planes and Passenger Medical Claims, An-
drews Aviation Litigation Reporter, May 28, 2002 at 3. Prewitt states that the
turning point for the more liberal definition was the 1999 Supreme Court decision
in El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155 (1999) in which the court held
that the Warsaw Convention created the exclusive cause of action for personal in-
jury claims stemming from an international flight. See id. After that decision,
Prewitt suggests, there has been a trend in lower courts to apply the definition of
the term "accident" more liberally in order to obtain recoveries for injured passen-
gers. See id.
18 Stone v. Continental Airlines, 905 F. Supp. 823 (D. Haw. 1995).
19 See generallly Staff, Mixed Messages from DVT lawsuits, Airline Business.,
August 1, 2003 at 1. DVT is also known as 'Economy Class Syndrome.'
20 See Cornett, supra note 14.
21 See id. at 164.
22 Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985).
23 Husain v. Olympic Airways, 316 F.3d 829 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 123
S. Ct. 2215 (2003).
24 See id. at 831.
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cle 17.25 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision.26 The Su-
preme Court has granted the writ of certiorari;27 the question
is, will their decision finally put this controversy to rest?
Part I of this article looks at the background of the Warsaw
Convention and its purpose. Part II examines the hallmark
case regarding Article 17 "accidents," Air France v. Saks. Part
III considers various cases within the broad classifications of
passenger-on-passenger assaults and medical claims that have
followed the Supreme Court's definition of "accident," and those
cases that have expanded the definition of the term "accident."
Part IV examines, in depth, the Ninth Circuit case of Husain v.
Olympic Airways, which has recently been granted certiorari by
the Supreme Court. Part IV also considers the potential deci-
sion of the Supreme Court and what implications that decision
will have on the Warsaw Convention and the airline industry.
II. THE WARSAW CONVENTION
The planners of the Warsaw Convention decided that,
"'what engineers are doing for machines, we must do for the
law.'"'28 It was drafted in 1929 and went into effect in 1933.29
The Convention was ratified by the United States in 1934.30 It
is a multilateral treaty that governs "the international carriage
of passengers, baggage, and cargo by air, and regulates the lia-
bility of international air carriers in over 120 nations."31 The
Convention emerged because of differences among countries re-
25 See Husain v. Olympic Airways, 116 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1135 (N.D. Cal.
2000), affd, 316 F.3d 829 (9th Cir. 2002).
26 See Husain, 316 F.3d at 840.
27 Husain v. Olympic Airways, 123 S. Ct. 2215 (2003).
28 Wright, supra note 6, at 455 (quoting from Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Allen I.
Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV. L. REV.
497, 498 (1967)).
29 See Wright, supra note 6, at 455-456.
30 See Loryn B. Zerner, Tseng v. El Al Israel Airlines and Article 25 of the
Warsaw Convention: A Cloud Left Uncharted, 14 AM. U. INTL L. REV. 1245, 1250
(1999).
31 Id. As of June 1999, 147 countries were parties to the Convention. See
Karp, supra note 7, at 1556. Berkley suggests that, with respect to the number of
nations that have signed the Warsaw Convention, the Convention is the "world's
most successful private law treaty." Blair J. Berkley, Warsaw Convention Claims
Arising From Airline-Passenger Violence, 6 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOR. AFF. 499,
535 n.7 (Fall, 2001/Winter 2002).
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garding liability rules governing air transportation accidents. 32
It had two general purposes. 33 First, the drafters wanted to cre-
ate a uniform set of rules for international travel.34 Second, the
drafters hoped to balance the interests of passengers in recover-
ing for personal injuries, baggage loss or damage, and delay,
with the airline's interest in limiting liability for potential
loss. 35
While the Warsaw Convention is very successful in some
respects, 36 uniformity has been difficult to achieve in the area of
airline liability for personal injury, as governed by Articles 17
through 30 of the Warsaw Convention. 37 This is because the
original text of the Convention was written in French, and thus
has left American courts "haunted" by interpretive difficul-
ties.38 Most common law countries have enacted legislation to
clarify many of the Convention's ambiguous terms; however,
the United States is not one of these countries. 39 Because of the
United States' failure to enact such legislation, the courts have
been left to interpret the gray areas of the Convention.
40
Article 17 states:
32 See Tory A. Weigand, Accident, Exclusivity, and Passenger Disturbances
Under the Warsaw Convention, 16 AM. U INT'L L. REV. 891, 892 (2001).
33 See Coleman, supra note 8, at 195; see also Wright, supra note 6, at 456;
Berkley, supra note 31, at 502.
34 See Coleman, supra note 8, at 195.
35 See id. Other objectives included: the need to avoid conflicts of law
problems, protecting the infant international transportation business, and to facil-
itate transactions between countries around the world.
36 See Gregory C. Walker, Doing Business in Montreal: The Effects of the Ad-
dition of "Fifth Forum" Jurisdiction Under the Montreal Convention, 23 PENN-
SILR 125, 136 (2004).
37 See Coleman, supra note 8, at 196. The Supreme Court has said that any
airline passenger seeking relief for personal injuries sustained during an interna-
tional flight is limited to filing claims under the Warsaw Convention. See Karp,
supra note 7, at 1556.
38 See Zerner, supra note 30, at 1269. The original French text of Article 17 is
as follows: "Le transporteur est responsable du dommage survenu en cas de mort,
de blessure ou de toute autre lesion corporelle subie par un voyageur lorsque
l'accident qui a cause le dommage s'est produit a bord de l'aeronef ou au cours de
toutes operations d'embarquement et debarquement." Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S.
392, n.2 (1985).
39 See Zerner, supra note 30, at 1270-1271. The Warsaw Convention is a self-
executing treaty that does not require any legislation by the signatories to imple-
ment the treaty. See id. at n.141.
40 See id. at 1271. The United States Constitution does not give much gui-
dance to domestic courts applying international law. See id. at n.141.
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The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of
death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suf-
fered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage so
sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any
operations of embarking or disembarking.4 1
Article 17 holds airlines only liable for accidents, indicating that
not all injuries occurring aboard a plane will be considered a
violation of the Convention. 42 However, the Convention did not
define the term "accident."43 U.S. courts are divided with re-
gards to whether Article 17 covers all injuries or only those inju-
ries that occur by accident. 44
III. AIR FRANCE v. SAKS
Courts have struggled with the term "accident" since the
1970's. 45 The Supreme Court in 1985 was first confronted with
the question of interpretation in Air France v. Saks. 46 The
Court cited in Saks that "the language of Article 17 is stark and
undefined." 47 Because so many courts have struggled with the
scope of Article 17, the Supreme Court found the intent of the
drafters to be a critical factor in determining a definition of the
term "accident."48
Ms. Saks was a passenger on an overseas flight from Paris,
France to Los Angeles, California.49 As the plane was landing,
41 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 state. 3000, T.S. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11,
reprinted in 449 U.S.C. 1502 (1998).
42 See Wright, supra note 6.
43 See Karp, supra note 7.
44 See Coleman, supra note 8, at 234-235.
45 See Jean-Paul Boulee, Recovery for Mental Injuries That Are Accompanied
by Physical Injuries under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention: The Progeny of
Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 24 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 501, 505 (1995). The
dispute did not come about until this time because the American courts simply
interpreted the Convention as limiting monetary damages. Id. at n.37. Courts
viewed the treaty as creating a "presumption of liability;" it was not until the late
1970's that the courts began to view the Convention also as an "independent
source of action." Id.
46 Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985).
47 Saks, 470 U.S. at 399 (citing Janice Cousins, Warsaw Convention- Air Car-
rier Liability for Passenger Injuries Sustained Within a Terminal, 45 FORDHAM
L. REV. 369, 388 (1976)).
48 See Grems, supra note 2, at 156.
49 See Saks, 470 U.S. at 394.
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Ms. Saks experienced great pressure and pain in her left ear
because of cabin pressurization changes.50 As a result, she suf-
fered permanent deafness. 51 She claimed the change in the
cabin pressure during the descent caused her deafness, and
thus, constituted an accident under Article 17.52 The Saks
Court suggested that the intent and expectations of the parties
are of paramount importance when interpreting a treaty.
53 It
stated: "it is our responsibility to give the specific words of the
treaty a meaning consistent with the shared expectations of the
contracting parties."54 Since the original treaty was written in
French, the Court relied on the French meaning of accident.
55
In the French language, the term "accident," when used to de-
scribe the cause of an injury, is defined as an "unusual," unex-
pected," or "unintended" event.56 The Court cited French
decisions and dictionaries to support its conclusion.5 7 The
50 See id.
51 See id.
52 See id. at 395.
53 See id. at 396-400.
54 Saks, 470 U.S. at 399.
55 See Karp, supra note 7. The Court also looked to the French language in
Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530 (1991) - the landmark case involving
the issue of whether Article 17 applies solely to physical injuries or also to mental
injuries unaccompanied by physical injuries or physical manifestations of an in-
jury. See Boulee, supra note 45. The Court was unable to find the Convention's
drafter's specific intent and concluded that there was probably no intention con-
cerning mental injuries absent a clearly expressed intention. See id. at 508. The
Court, lead by Justice Marshall, ruled that the term "lesion corporelle," the French
phrase for bodily injury used by the drafters, referred only to physical injuries. See
Kurtis A. Kemper, What Constitutes an Accident under Warsaw Convention (49
U.S.C.A. Note: ?§ 40105), 147 A.L.R. FED. 535, (Updated July 2003).
56 Karp, supra note 7.
Courts which have grappled with the application of Article 17, both before
and after Saks, have weighed several factors in determining whether par-
ticular events that allegedly caused passenger damages constituted acci-
dents. These considerations focus on the relationship of the claimed
accidents to (1) the normal operations of the aircraft or airline; (2) the
knowledge and/or complicity of crew members in the events surrounding
the alleged accident; (3) the acts of fellow passengers, whether intentional
or not; (4) the acts of third persons who are not crew or passengers, e.g.,
hijackers and terrorists; (5) the location of the occurrence in the contin-
uum of air travel; (6) the role, condition and reaction of the complainant in
connection with the occurrence at issue; and (7) the kinds of risks inher-
ent in air travel.
Fulop v. Malev Hungarian Airlines, 175 F. Supp. 2d 651, 657 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
57 See Kemper, supra note 55.
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Court adopted this definition and further stated that event, as
stated above, had to be external to the passenger. 58 "An Article
17 'accident' is not the passenger's injury; rather it is an 'acci-
dent' which caused the passenger's injury."59 The Court distin-
guished between cases of "accidents" and cases of
"occurrences." 60  The Court found that Ms. Saks' deafness,
caused by the depressurization of the plane, was not an "acci-
dent" within Article 17 because it was the passenger's internal
reaction to the usual, depressurization of the plane (emphasis
added).61
A closer look at the Saks decision shows that the Supreme
Court did not intend to expand the term "accident" beyond the
drafters' intent, nor did they intend to eliminate the necessity of
a nexus between the injury causing the accident and the opera-
tion of the aircraft.62 The Court also did not intend to classify
all passenger upon passenger torts to be a violation of Article
17.63 Saks interpreted the term "accident" in a restrictive,
rather than expansive manner.64 Many lower (district) courts
have followed Saks in strictly interpreting the term "accident"
under Article 17.65 However, the Saks definition has not been
uniformly applied among circuit courts. 66
58 See Wright, supra note 6, at 460.
59 Saks, 470 U.S. at 398.
60 See Kemper, supra note 55, at 538. Wright suggests that according to the
drafters, Article 17 should be construed to allow a passenger to recover damages
only if the accident was related to air travel and the passenger could show a con-
nection between the accident and operation of the aircraft. See Wright, supra note
6, at 476.
61 See Saks, 470 U.S. at 406.
62 See Weigand, supra note 32, at 938.
63 See id. at 838.
64 See id. at 938.
65 See id. at 940; see Tsevas v. Delta Airlines, 1997 WL 767278 (N.D. Ill.
1997); Salerno v. Pan American World Airlines, 606. F.Supp. 656 (S.D.N.Y. 1985);
Cush v. BWI Intern. Airways, Ltd., 175 F.Supp. 2d 483 (E.D.N.Y. 2001); Waters v.
Port Authority of New York & New Jersey, 158 F.Supp. 2d (D.N.J. 2001); Dillon v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 162 F.Supp. 2d 380 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Chukwu v. Air France,
218 F.Supp. 2d 979 (N.D. Ill. 2002); Blansett v. Continental Airlines, 246 F.Supp.
2d 596 (S. D. Tex. 2002); McCaskey v. Continental Airlines, 159 F.Supp. 2d 562
(S.D. Tex. 2001); Price v. KLM- Royal Dutch Airlines, 107 F.Supp. 2d 1365 (N.D.
GA 2000). These courts have all held that an accident is "an unusual or unex-
pected event or happening that is external to the passenger." See generally Kern-
per, supra note 55, at 538-539.
66 See Weigand, supra note 32, at 938. Courts in other signatory countries
have adopted a very similar definition as the Saks Court adopted and have not
416 [Vol. 16:409
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IV. CASELAW AFTER SAKS
A. Passenger-on-Passenger Assault Cases
Some courts have been hesitant to expand the definition of
the term "accident" to include all intentional torts committed by
a passenger. 67 Although the Saks court did not expressly state
such an expansion, many courts have interpreted Saks to imply
that the accident must result from "risks characteristic of air
travel," and the accident must have some "relationship to the
operation of the airline."68 For example, in Stone v. Continental
Airlines,69 the plaintiff's claim for an injury suffered from an
unprovoked punch by an intoxicated fellow passenger was dis-
missed because the assault could not be an "accident" as it was
not a "risk characteristic of air travel."70 In Price v. British Air-
ways,71 the court granted summary judgment for British Air-
ways when a passenger claimed an injury after being punched
in the face by a fellow passenger as the plane taxied to the gate
upon landing.72 The court also held that the occurrence was not
an "accident" under Article 17 because it held no relation to the
seemed to stray. See Karp, supra note 7, at 1558. For example, a British court in
Chaudhari v. British Airways, Plc. decided that a passenger's claim was not an
"accident" under Article 17 because the injuries resulted from a pre-existing medi-
cal disability. See id. The court concluded "the injuries were not caused by any
'unexpected or unusual event or happening external to the passenger;' rather these
injuries were caused by his own personal, particular, or peculiar reaction to the
normal operation of the aircraft." Id. (quoting Times 7 May 1997 (Apr. 16, 1997)). A
Canadian Court followed a similar pattern in Quinn v. Canadian Airlines Interna-
tional, Ltd., [1994] 18 O.R. 3d 226 when it held that turbulence was not unusual or
unexpected, thus the resulting injuries did not constitute an "accident" under Arti-
cle 17. See id.
67 See Karp, supra note 7, at 1560.
68 Kemper, supra note 55, at 539.
The suggestion that an "accident" must relate to the operation of aircraft
appears to have its source in Professor Goedhuis, official Reporter at the
Warsaw Convention. He reasoned that "the carrier does not guarantee
safety; he is only obliged to take all the measures which a good carrier
would take for the safety of his passengers." However, Professor
Goedhuis's suggestion was never included in the text of the Warsaw
Convention.
Berkley, supra note 31, at 517 (quoting D. GOEDHUIS, NATIONAL AIR LEGIS-
LATIONS AND THE WARSAW CONVENTION 200 (1937)); see also Gezzi v. Brit-
ish Airways, 991 F.2d 603 (9th Cir. 1993).
69 Stone v. Continental Airlines, 905 F. Supp. 823 (D. Haw. 1995).
70 Id. at 827.
71 Price v. British Airways, 1992 WL 170679 (S.D.N.Y.).
72 See generally, id..
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aircraft, and it would be "absurd to find that a fistfight between
passengers was either a characteristic risk of air travel or a risk
that air carriers could easily guard against through protective
security measures."7 3 Many courts have adopted a more liberal
scope of the term "accident" under Article 17 when dealing with
passenger torts.74 The court in Saks said, although not all pas-
senger torts are "accidents," the definition should be "flexibly
applied after an assessment of all the circumstances [of the
occurrence]. ,,75
Courts have recently expanded airline liability in response to
the rise in sexual assaults aboard commercial airlines.7 6 Wal-
lace v. Korean Air7 7 is the leading case in a series of court liber-
alizations of airline liability for passenger tort actions.78 In
Wallace, Brandi Wallace boarded a nonstop flight from Seoul,
Korea to Los Angeles, California.79 Ms. Wallace sat in an econ-
omy seat next to two men whom she did not know.8 0 After the
meal, Ms. Wallace fell asleep.8 1 The lights on the plane were
dimmed to allow for passengers to watch a movie or sleep.8 2
She awoke to find that one of the men, Mr. Parks, had unbut-
73 Karp, supra note 7, at 1560 (citing Price, 1992 WL 170679 at 3.)
74 See Berkley, supra note 31, at 511. Berkley suggests that characterizing
passenger-on-passenger assaults as "accidents" under Article 17, imposing liability
on airlines, is a good policy for two reasons:
(1) such characterization gives incentive to airlines to develop defense
measures in promoting passenger safety;
(2) airlines, as opposed to individual passengers, can better assess the
probabilities of an assault, and balance the risk reduction, gained by
the given preventative measures (such as on-board security personnel)
against its costs.
Id.
75 Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 405 (1985). The court also noted that an
accident may exist depending particularly on whether the airlines played a causal
role, and the occurrence of an accident is not predicated on whether the tort was or
was not intentional. See id.
76 See Karp, supra note 7, at 1561.
77 Wallace v. Korean Air, 214 F.3d 293 (2nd Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 2001 U.S.
LEXIS 1113.
78 See Karp, supra note 7, at 1561.
79 See Wallace, 214 F.3d at 295.
80 See id.
81 See id. Prior to falling asleep, Wallace did not expressly or implicitly indi-
cate that she wanted to have intimate relations with the men whom she was next
to. See id.
82 See id. at 299.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol16/iss2/7
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toned and unzipped her shorts, and was fondling her genitals.83
Although Wallace turned her body towards the window to avoid
the attack, Parks continued.8 4 Wallace then jumped over Parks
into the aisle and reported the attack to a flight attendant, who
moved her seat.8 5 Ms. Wallace brought an action in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York in
1998 alleging that under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention,
Korean Air was liable for Mr. Parks' assault.
8 6
This Wallace case involved an issue of first impression for
the Second Circuit.87 The Supreme Court in Saks failed to ex-
pressly define what the inherent risks of air travel were.88 The
Wallace court held that Mr. Parks' assault on Ms. Wallace was
an "accident" under Article 17,89 and thus Korean Air was lia-
ble. 90 The court found that, "an airline presumably would be
liable for all passenger injuries, including those caused by co-
passenger torts, regardless of whether they arose from a risk
characteristic of air travel."91 However, the court said that the
very characteristics of air travel increased Wallace's vulnerabil-
ity to assault, including the confined space in economy class, the
lights being dimmed at the time of the assault, and the flight
crew's failure to notice Mr. Parks' actions.
92
Courts have also imposed liability on airlines where a link
in the chain of causation was an act or omission on the part of
83 See Wallace, 214 F.3d at 295.
84 See id.
85 See id.
86 See id.
87 See Wright, supra note 6, at 472.
88 See id. at 473.
89 Incidents of sexual assault have not been limited to female passengers. See
Karp, supra note 7, at 1563; see Langadinos v. American Airlines, 199 F.3d 68 (1st
Cir. 2000) (male passenger's injuries suffered from an intoxicated fellow male pas-
senger grabbing his groin area while in line for the restroom was an "accident"
within Article 17).
90 See Wallace, 214 F.3d at 299.
91 Id. The holding of the case was based on the "virtual strict liability" im-
posed on airlines and the Supreme Court's command to flexibly and broadly inter-
pret the term "accident." See id.
92 See id. Judge Pooler stated in his concurrence that a co-passenger tort sat-
isfies the definition of the term "accident" simply because it is an "unexpected" and
"unusual" event. See id. at 300.
.2004]
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the airline or its employees.9 3 In Tsevas v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc.,94 a female passenger sued Delta Air Lines after she was
physically and verbally assaulted by an intoxicated male pas-
senger in the seat next to her.95 During the flight, the flight
crew was serving the man alcoholic beverages and the woman
informed the flight attendant of his intoxication.96 However,
the flight attendant refused to move the woman to another seat
until after the man "grabbed," "fondled," and "kissed" her.97
The court held that the woman's injuries were an "accident" be-
cause the assault, service of alcohol, and the refusal of the flight
crew to intervene constituted "unexpected" or "unusual" events
external to the passenger that were beyond the normal opera-
tion of the aircraft. 98
Similarly in Langadinos v. American Airlines,99 an intoxi-
cated male passenger grabbed a fellow passenger's groin, caus-
ing great pain, while on line for the restroom. 100 The flight crew
did not respond to the man's plea for help, claiming the assail-
ant was "harmless."101 The flight crew continued to serve the
assailant alcohol even after they knew him to be intoxicated
and acting "erratically." 02 The court held that an Article 17
"accident" covered co-passenger torts where the airline employ-
ees had a causal role in the commission of the tort. 03
93 See Karp, supra note 7, at 1564. Omissions will lead to Article 17 "acci-
dents" because there is a common-law duty for airlines to protect passengers from
foreseeable risks. See Berkley, supra note 31, at 509.
94 Tsevas v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,1997 WL 767278 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
95 See id. at 1.
96 See id.
97 Id. at 3.
98 See id.
99 Langadinos v. American Airlines, 199 F.3d 68 (1st Cir. 2000).
100 See id. at 70.
101 See id.
102 See id.
103 See Langadinos, 199 F.3d at 71; see also Schneider v. Swiss Air Transport
Company, 686 F.Supp. 15 (D. Maine 1988) (the reclining of two seats in front of the
plaintiff along with the refusal of the occupants of the seats to raise the seats when
asked to do so, and the failure of the flight attendant to intervene when asked could
be considered to be external to the plaintiff and outside the expected and normal
operation of the air plane); Fishman v. Delta Air Lines, 132 F.3d. 138 (2nd Cir.
1998) (scalding of a child by a flight attendant attempting to alleviate the child's
earache was an "accident" within Article 17); Carey v. United Airlines, 77 F. Supp.
2d 1165 (D. Oregon 1999) (an "accident" occurred from a series of flight attendant
actions including refusing to allow the claimant and his children to switch seats,
engaging in a heated exchange with the claimant, informing him he would be ar-
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B. Medical Claim Cases
Medical Claims are another class of cases that have caused
the courts confusion. 104 While it is recognized that a health
condition is not an accident unless triggered by an unusual or
unexpected event, 10 5 difficulty surfaces when the medical condi-
tion occurs during an "uneventful" flight, and the passenger
claims that the actions or omissions of the flight crew aggra-
vated the condition. 10 6 In Abramson v. Japan Airlines,0 7 the
plaintiff suffered a pre-existing hiatal hernia attack. 08 The at-
tack could have been alleviated by a "self-help" remedy of lying
down and massaging his stomach from side to side.' 0 9 When
his wife asked for an empty seat for her husband to lie down,
she was told there were none available." 0 Plaintiff alleged that
his condition worsened due to the lack of opportunity to employ
"self-help." Consequently, he was hospitalized after arriving in
Tokyo."' The Circuit Court held that the injuries suffered by
the plaintiff were not risks associated with or inherent in air-
craft operation. 1 2 Thus, the alleged acts and omissions of the
flight crew did not constitute an "accident" under Article 17."
13
Similarly in Krys v. Lufthansa German Airlines," 4 the pas-
senger suffered a heart attack during the flight, and he sued on
the basis of the air carrier's negligence in failing to make an
unscheduled landing at an available airport in response to his
rested, and publicly humiliating him on board the plane); but see Lahey v. Singa-
pore Airlines, 115 F. Supp. 2d 464, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ( "the actions of the crew
are not relevant to the determination of whether [an] assault was an 'accident'
because it is clear that nothing in the term 'accident' suggests a requirement of
culpable conduct on the part of the airline crew.")
104 See Weigand, supra note 32, at 953.
105 Such as a passenger suffering a heart attack due to an emergency landing.
See id.
106 See id. at 953.
107 Abramson v. Japan Airlines, 739 F.2d 130 (3rd Cir. 1984).
108 See id. at 131.
109 See id.
110 However, discovery revealed that there were nine empty seats in first class.
See id.
111 See id.
112 See id. at 133.
113 See Abramson, 739 F.2d at 133.
114 Krys v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 119 F.3d 1515 (11th Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 916.
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symptoms, thus aggravating the damage to his heart.115 The
court did not even look to the crew's negligence; it focused solely
on the underlying event (the attack). 116 The court found no dis-
cernable distinction between the case at hand and Abramson,
and found that an injury due to a unique internal condition of a
passenger is not an "accident" for purposes of the Warsaw
Convention.117
However, in at least a few instances, courts have held that
it is not the heart attack, but rather the flight crew's negligence
in giving medical assistance that constitutes an "accident"
under Article 17.118 In Seguritan v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., "9
the court held that a fatal heart attack suffered by a passenger,
allegedly as a result of the air crews' failure to provide medical
assistance, was an "accident."120 The court said, "[t]he 'acci-
115 See id. at 1517.
116 See id. at 1521-1522.
117 See id. at 1522. See also El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155(1999) (a routine, although intrusive, security search is not an "unusual" or "unex-
pected" event and thus is not an "accident"); Fischer v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,
623 F. Supp. 1064 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (the passenger's heart attack and subsequent
death were not the result of an unexpected or unusual event, but rather the pas-
senger's illness was a result of an internal disability); Tandon v. United Airlines,926 F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (failure to provide medical assistance to a heart
attack victim is not the type of external, unusual event for which there can beliability under the Warsaw Convention); McDowell v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 54
F. Supp. 2d 1313 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (airline crew's continuation of a flight to its
scheduled destination after a passenger's heart attack was not an "accident" under
the Warsaw Convention); Hipolito v. Northwest Airlines, 2001 WL 861984 (4th
Cir. (V.A.)) (although the passenger suffering a fatal asthma attack could not get
the requested oxygen mask to operate, there was no "accident" under Article 17because the attack was not exacerbated by an external event, but was caused by
the passenger's internal reaction to the usual, normal, and expected operation of
the airplane). Weigand, in reaction to Krys and Tseng, has this to say:
It is simply incongruous to hold that a carrier is not liable for failing to
take any actions to aid a passenger stricken with a medical condition, but
is liable for passenger upon passenger torts. After all, it is certainly con-
sistent with the Warsaw scheme to find 'after assessment of all the cir-
cumstances' that an 'accident' occurs when a flight crew does not make
reasonable efforts to assist stricken passengers. Such action or inaction, if
contrary to established airline procedures or standards, could be 'unusual
and unexpected' in modern air travel, and is certainly an abnormal air-
craft operation....
Weigand, supra note 32, at 955.
118 See Kemper, supra note 55, at 546.
119 Seguritan v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 446 N.Y.S. 2d 397 (2d Dep't 1982).
This case was later dismissed as untimely. See id at 399.
120 See id. at 398.
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dent' is not the heart attack suffered by the decedent. Rather, it
is the alleged aggravation of decedent's condition by the negli-
gent failure of defendant's employees to render her medical as-
sistance."121 Likewise, Kemelman v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.
122
was a wrongful death action where the survivor's decedent suf-
fered a heart attack on an international flight.123 The court de-
nied the airline's motion for summary judgment, finding that it
could not be said as a matter of law that the procedures em-
ployed by the flight crew in response to the decedent's medical
situation were not carried out in a reasonable manner.12
4 The
court stated, "'[a]n injury resulting from routine procedures in
the operation of an aircraft or airplane can be an 'accident' if
those procedures or operations are carried out in an unreasona-
ble manner.""1 25
In recent years, there have been a number of personal in-
jury claims against international aircraft carriers, for a condi-
tion known as Deep Vein Thrombophlebitis (DVT).126 It is also
121 The court made an analogy comparing this case to a hijacking case, where
the "accident" that caused the injury was not the act of the hijackers but rather the
failure of the airlines to provide sufficient security. See id.
122 Kemelman v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. 740 N.Y.S. 434 (App. Div. 2d Dep't
2002).
123 See id. at 435.
124 See id. at 436.
125 Id. (quoting Fishman v. Delta Air Lines, 132 F.3d. 138, 143 (2nd Cir.
1998)); see also Fulop v. Malev Hungarian Airlines, 175 F. Supp. 2d 651, 665
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (the airline's "alleged deviation from its own rules and standards
that were in place to deal with passengers stricken by medical emergencies may be
sufficient to support a determination that such an event - the relevant occurrence
properly here at issue - was unusual or unexpected, and thus an accident within
Saks's interpretation of the Convention's Article 17.").
126 See Prewitt, supra note 17, at 1. "DVT refers to a blood clot embedded in
one of the major deep veins in the lower legs, thighs, or pelvis. A clot blocks blood
circulation through these veins, which carry blood from the feet to the heart."
Available at http://www.emedicine.com/aaem/topicl48.htm. This can often cause
pain, swelling, or even death. See id. About 10% of air travelers develop DVT, but
most clots dissolve naturally. See Arianne Aryanpur, 'Economy class syndrome'
lawsuits against airlines can move forward, USA Today, July 29, 2003, at 1. But
those that do not can travel to the lungs, causing a potentially fatal pulmonary
embolism, or clots can also travel to the brain causing a stroke. See id. If the clot
remains lodged in the leg, serious damage may occur and can result in tissue dam-
age, ulcerations, skin lesions, or, in serious cases, removal of the leg. See Associa-
tion of Trial Lawyers of America, CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN AVIATION
LAW, Ann.2003 ATLA-CLE 1661 (July 2003).
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called "Economy Class Syndrome"127 because of the increased
risk of clots due to leg inactivity and cramped seat space poten-
tially causing poor circulation for a prolonged time period. 12s
DVT is one of the most pressing issues in aviation law today. 129
The subject of lawsuits worldwide, the issue is whether DVT is
deemed an "accident" under Article 17, and to what extent
should airlines be liable to passengers who suffer from DVT.130
There has been minimal case law on this issue. 13 1 Many air-
lines were granted summary judgment because courts thought
there was no issue of material fact. 132 In an early case, Scherer
v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.,133 the court granted an
airline summary judgment where the plaintiff had brought a
DVT claim against it.134 The court threw out the plaintiffs con-
tention that he suffered DVT while merely "sitting" aboard an
airplane and declared that there must be bodily injury in order
to come within the purview of Article 17.135
However, "lawsuits filed by air travelers suing airlines for
blood clots caused by 'deep-vein' thrombosis are beginning to
see the light of day."1 36 Two cases filed by passengers who de-
veloped DVT on international flights have been allowed to pro-
127 See Staff, supra note 19. Long distance air travelers are especially prone to
DVT regardless or age, gender, or physical condition. See Association of Trial Law-
yers of America, supra note 126.
128 See Association of Trial Lawyers of America, supra note 126.
129 See Association of Trial Lawyers of America, supra note 126.
130 See id; see also Prewitt, supra note 17, at 1.
131 See Prewitt, supra note 17, at 1.
132 See id.
133 Scherer v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 387 N.Y.S. 2d 580 (1st Dep't
1976).
134 See id. at 581.
135 See Scherer, 387 N.Y.S. 2d at 581; see also Toteja v. British Airways, 1999WL 1425399 (D. Md. July 20, 1999) (plaintiffs' claim of their economy seats provid-ing insufficient leg room and thus causing leg swelling was dismissed on the
grounds that there was no "accident" for purposes of Article 17); Margrave v. Brit-ish Airways, 643 F. Supp. 510, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("extended sitting in an air-plane, even an uncomfortable condition, cannot properly be characterized as the
sort of 'accident' that triggers an airline's liability under the Warsaw Convention.")
136 Allison Altman, Blood clot suits against airlines clear early round, 'Deep-
vein' thrombosis claims may go to Trial, NAT'L L.J., 1 (2003). While DVT lawsuits
in the United States have advanced, a United Kingdom court has thrown "a signif-
icant obstacle in their path." Staff, supra note 19. In early July 2003, UK lawyers
representing 24 victims of DVT due to long flights lost their appeal against 18
airlines who they claim were responsible for the onset of the passengers' DVT. See
id.
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ceed past a motion to dismiss. 137 This is only the second and
third time such suits have been allowed to proceed. 138 In Miller
v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc. , 3 9 Debra Miller suffered a near-fatal
heart attack and had open-heart surgery to remove a blood clot
after traveling on a flight from Paris, France to San Francisco,
California.1 4° Judge Walker cited Saks and held that "negli-
gence is not a required element for recovery... [o]ne states a
claim under the convention merely by alleging damages result-
ing from an 'accident' that occurred during an international
flight."' 41 The court defined "accident" as the airline's failure to
warn passengers about the risk of DVT, adding that there were
"unexpected or unusual event[s] or happening[s] external to the
passenger."1 42
Air France v. Saks143 set the precedent by defining an accident
as an "unexpected or unusual event that is external to the pas-
137 See Altman, supra note 136; see also Aryanpur, supra note 126.
138 See Altman, supra note 136; see also Aryanpur, supra note 126.
139 Miller v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 260 F. Supp. 2d 931 (N.D. Cal. 2003). The
second case, decided at the same time, is Wylie v. American Airlines, Inc., 260 F.
Supp. 2d 931 (N.D. Cal. 2003). In this case, Wylie was hospitalized for a week
after he developed a blood clot in his leg after a trip from Paris to San Francisco.
See id.
140 See 'Economy Class Syndrome' Back in the News at: http://my.webmd.com/
contentlarticle/30/17 2 8 69829.htm?lastselectedguid={5FE84E90-BC77-405
6 A 9 1
C-9531713CA348} (Jan 12, 2001).
141 Id.
142 Miller, 260 F. Supp. 2d at 933; see also Blansett v. Continental Airlines, 246
F. Supp. 2d 596 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (airline's failure to warn a passenger of the risk of
DVT was an "accident" which resulted in the passenger suffering a major stroke
after developing DVT while on an international flight). It has been suggested that
this liberal movement towards holding an airline liable for failing to warn passen-
gers about DVT stems from the Ninth Circuit's holding in Husain v. Olympic Air-
ways, 316 F.3d 829 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 2215 (2003), where the
court found that the air crew's failure to respond to a passenger's known risk was
"unusual and unexpected" and thus, constituted an "accident" under Article 17.
See Association of Trial Lawyers of America, supra note 126.
A growing number of airlines, including Singapore Airlines, British Airways, and
Australia's two biggest airlines, will begin to warn passengers of the risks of devel-
oping potentially fatal blood clots while abroad long flights. See 'Economy Class
Syndrome' Back in the News, supra note 140. According to Singapore Airlines,
health tips will be displayed at check-in counters and on board the aircraft, printed
on laminated cards placed in each seat pocket. These tips will advise passengers
how to relieve stress, minimize jet lag, and reduce the risk of motion sickness,
heart conditions, and DVT. See id.
143 Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985).
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senger."144 This interpretation was a restrictive rather than an
expansive one. 145 However, the court also said that the defini-
tion should be "flexibly applied after an assessment of all the
circumstances [of the occurrence] ."146 The court also noted that
whether an accident may exist depends particularly on whether
the airline played a causal role. 14 7 Many courts have used this
dicta to justify an expansion of the term "accident." For exam-
ple, cases involving a medical emergency resulting from a pas-
senger's own internal reaction to the normal operation of the
aircraft on an international flight have often been excluded as
"accidents" because they have not met the Saks test. 48 How-
ever, before automatically excluding the "injury" as a non-acci-
dent, courts will now carefully examine whether the flight crew
followed normal operating procedures.149 If there is any devia-
tion from the standard procedures, and if that deviation can be
causally linked to the aggravation of the passenger's medical
condition, some courts have found that an Article 17 "accident"
has occurred and have imposed liability on the airline.1 50
V. HUSAIN V. OLYMPIC AIRWAYS
The question of whether liability exists when air carriers
aggravate or cause injuries to passengers through its actions or
inactions has recently been answered by the Ninth Circuiti 5i in
Husain v. Olympic Airways.152 Husain departs from stricter
case law by finding that an air crew's failure to respond to a
known risk to a passenger was an "accident" under Article 17
because the crew could have minimized the risk by a simple ac-
tion without disturbing the normal operation of the aircraft. 153
The court seems to heed this declaration made by the Southern
District of Florida in McDowell v. Continental Airlines, Inc.15 4
144 Id. at 405.
145 See Weigand, supra note 32, at 938.
146 Saks, 470 U.S. at 405.
147 See id.
148 See Cornett, supra note 14.
149 See Prewitt, supra note 17.
150 See id.
151 See Cornett, supra note 14.
152 Husain v. Olympic Airways, 316 F.3d 829 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 123
S. Ct. 2215 (2003).
153 See Cornett, supra note 14.
154 McDowell v. Continental Airlines, Inc, 54 F. Supp. 1313 (S.D. Fla. 1999).
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The result of the union of Krys and Tseng [1551 is a dissolution of
an airline's duty of care to its passengers so long as the cause of a
passenger's initial injury is internal to the passenger himself.
This holds true so long as the airline takes no affirmative action
which aggravates the injury. Complete inaction is acceptable,
even if in doing nothing the airline aggravates the passenger's
injury.156
Husain was a wrongful death suit, filed under the liability
provisions of the Warsaw Convention on December 24, 1998 by
the decedent's wife, Mrs. Husain. 157 Dr. Hanson, along with his
wife Mrs. Husain, and their children were on an Olympic Air-
ways flight from Athens, Greece to New York City.158 Dr. Han-
son, 52 years old, was an asthmatic who was particularly
sensitive to second hand smoke.' 5 9 The family was seated in
the plane's nonsmoking section. 160 However, the non-smoking
section seats were only three rows in front of the smoking sec-
tion, and there was no partition between the two sections.1 61 As
soon as the flight began, smoke from the smoking section en-
veloped the family. 162 Mrs. Husain had asked the flight crew
multiple times to move Dr. Hanson to another seat away from
the smoking section.' 63 She explained the critical reasons why
her husband had to be moved, and she made her concerns
known about the possible consequences of allowing her husband
to remain in his original seat.'64 The crew ignored Mrs.
Husain. 65 Dr. Hanson's breathing deteriorated and after his
155 Krys v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 119 F.3d 1515 (11th Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 916; El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155
(1999).
156 McDowell, 54 F. Supp. at 1320.
157 See Cornett, supra note 14, at 165. The suit was originally filed in state
court, but Olympic Airways had the case removed to the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California on March 23, 1999. See id.
158 See Hussain v. Olympic Airways, 116 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1123 (N.D. Cal.
2000), affd, 316 F.3d 829 (9th Cir. 2002).
159 See id.
160 Husain, 316 F.3d at 831.
161 See id. at 833.
162 See id. at 834.
163 See id. at 832.
164 See id. at 832.
165 See Husain, 316 F.3d at 831. The flight crew did tell Mrs. Husain that her
husband could change seats with another passenger; however, Mrs. Husain would
have to ask the passenger herself without the aid of the flight crew. See Husain,
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meal, he got up from his seat to get away from the smoke. 166 He
then suffered a fatal asthma attack caused by the exposure to
smoke. 167
The plaintiffs relied on the holding in Saks, in which the
Supreme Court explained that while an "accident" must cause
the passenger's injury, it need not be the sole cause; "the pas-
senger must be able to prove that some link in the chain was an
unusual or unexpected event external to the passenger."16  The
plaintiffs argued that three different occurrences during their
flight constituted an "accident" under the Warsaw Convention:
(1) the flight crew's refusal to move Dr. Hanson to another seat;(2) the flight crew's inability to provide oxygen in a timely man-
ner; and (3) the captain's failure to engage the "no smoking
sign" during Dr. Hanson's episode.169 Olympic argued that Dr.
Hanson's death resulted from "internal reactions to the usual,
normal, and expected operation of the aircraft" and thus, was
not an accident.' 70
The district court found that only the first occurrence con-
stituted an "accident."17 1 It specifically recognized that the
flight crew (1) violated the recognized standard of care required
of flight crew on international flights by refusing to assist; (2)
violated Olympic's policy; and (3) failed to alert the chief flight
crew member to help Dr. Hanson find another seat. 72 Accord-
116 F. Supp. 2d at 1126. This flight, unknown to the family, contained eleven
empty passenger seats. See id.
166 See Husain, 316 F.3d at 834.
167 See id. at 831. Although there was no autopsy to determine the direct cause
of Dr. Hanson's death, due to the family's religious beliefs, the district court deter-
mined, by a preponderance of evidence, the primary cause of death was smoke
exposure during the first two hours of the flight (this finding rested on the timing
of the events aboard the plane). See id. at 834.
168 Saks, 470 U.S. at 406.
169 See Husain, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 1131. The plaintiffs contended that a flight
crew who does nothing to deal with a known risk to a passenger's health-related
travel problem is negligent. See Husain, 316 F.3d at 836. They further argued
that because crew negligence is external to the passenger and not reasonably ex-
pected as a part of international travel, negligent conduct fits under the definition
of "accident" under Article 17. See id.
170 Id. A predicate to that argument is that the presence of smoke in the cabin
is "an expected and normal aspect of international air travel." Id. Thus, Olympic
had no duty to Dr. Hanson. See id.
171 See Husain 116 F. Supp. 2d at 1131.
172 See id. at 1132.
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ingly, the judge, in a non-jury trial, awarded $700,000 in dam-
ages and $700,000 in non-pecuniary damages to the Plaintiff.
173
Olympic Airways appealed the district court decision to the
Ninth Circuit.174 They argued that Dr. Hanson's death resulted
from his own internal reactions, and thus was not an "accident"
under the definition set forth by the Supreme Court in Saks.17
5
In reviewing the district court's decisions of fact and law for
clear error, the Ninth Circuit looked to Saks to determine
whether an accident had occurred under Article 17.176 The
Court noted that in determining whether an accident occurred,
the Supreme Court in Saks requires a flexible assessment of all
the circumstances surrounding the injury.' 7 7 Applying the Su-
preme Court's fact-specific mandate, the Ninth Circuit affirmed
the district court's findings.' 78 The Court determined that the
flight crew's conduct went beyond a mere negligence standard,
because the crew in charge knew of the potential danger to Dr.
Hanson. 179 The Court assigned an important duty to the airline
under Article 17: "where a crew can assist a passenger suffering
from a pre-existing condition, it must or such an omission ren-
ders the carrier liable where it could have taken reasonable
steps to prevent aggravation of the condition."' 8 0
The Court distinguished its holding in Husain from two
similar aggravating injury cases,' 8 ' Abramson v. Japan Air-
lines'8 2 and Krys v. Lufthansa German Airlines. '8 3 The courts
in both of these cases held that the aggravation of the passen-
173 See Husain, 316 F.3d at 832. The original damages amounted to $1,400,000
in total; however, each amount was reduced by 50% due to Dr. Hanson's compara-
tive negligence. See id.
174 See Husain, 316 F.3d at 831.
175 See id. at 836.
176 See id. at 835.
177 See Hussain 316 F.3d at 835.
178 See id.
179 See id.
180 Cornett, supra note 14, at 167. The initial burden of proof is on the plaintiff
to show that the injury was caused by an "accident." See Olympic Airways v.
Husain, 2004 LEXIS 1620 at n5. Once the plaintiff has proven a prima facie case
of liability under Article 17 creating a presumption of air carrier liability, the bur-
den shifts to the air carrier to rebut the presumption and prove lack of negligence
under Article 20. See id. (citation omitted).
181 See Husain, 316 F.3d at 836.
182 Abramson v. Japan Airlines, 739 F.2d 130 (3rd Cir. 1984).
183 Krys v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 119 F.3d 1515 (11th Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 916.
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gers' pre-existing medical conditions were not a result of "unu-
sual" or "unexpected" external events.'8 4 The distinguishing
factor, however, is the fact that neither crew was aware of a pre-
existing medical condition nor of a need for urgent action.'8 5
The Husain court further noted, "[tihe failure to act in the face
of a known, serious risk is an 'accident' under the Convention so
long as reasonable alternatives exist that would substantially
minimize the risk and implementing these alternatives would
not unreasonably interfere with the normal, expected operation
of the airplane." 8 6
A. Petition for Certiorari
On July 11, 2003, Olympic Airways filed a petition for certi-
orari asking if "an aggravation of the passenger's pre-existing
internal condition can satisfy the 'accident' condition precedent
to liability under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention . ."187
The Olympic arguments are based on the three tenets of Saks:
(1) The presumption of liability under Article 17 cannot rest upon
a mere 'occurrence' of an injury; rather, the passenger's injury
must be 'caused by' an 'accident,' defined by the Court as an
'unexpected or unusual event or happening' that is external to
the passenger.
(2) While the definition should be flexibly applied, 'when the in-
jury indisputably results from the passenger's own internal
reaction to the usual, normal, and expected operation of the
aircraft, it has not been caused by an accident, and Article 17
of the Warsaw Convention cannot apply.'
184 See id. at 836-837
185 See id. at 837.
186 Husain, 316 F.3d at 837. Cornett states in her article that if the airline in
Husain was not held liable for the international act committed by the flight crew
members that resulted in a passenger's death, that would completely rid the air-
line of any duty to its passengers. See Cornett, supra note 14, at 168. She suggests
that such a result could not have been the intention of the drafters of the Warsaw
Convention. See id.
187 Petitioner's Brief at 9, Husain v. Olympic Airways, 316 F.3d 829 (9th Cir.
2002) (No. 02-1348). The Air Transport Association of America., Inc. supports
Olympic Airways as amicus curiae. For a summary of their arguments, see Brief
for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Husain v.
Olympic Airways, 316 F.3d 829 (9th Cir. 2002) (No. 02-1348).
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(3) The 'accident' requirement of Article 17 'involves an inquiry
into the nature of the event which caused the injury rather
than the care taken by the airline to avert injury." 8
Olympic argues first that the "accident" standard created
by the Ninth Circuit is contrary to the language, structure, and
nature of airline liability created by the Convention.' 8 9 An air
carrier is presumed liable if there is a "happening of an acci-
dent."190 Olympic argues that, "considerations of air carrier
and passenger fault are expressly regulated by Article 21(1) of
the Convention." 191 The Court in Saks said that, "the accident
requirement of Article 17 is distinct from the defenses in Article
20(1)."192 Article 17 involves an inquiry into the nature of the
event that caused the injury, and Article 20 involves the care
taken by the airline to avert the injury. 193 They argue that both
the district court and the Ninth Circuit improperly shifted the
focus of the "accident" requirement from the nature of the event
(the smoke) to the care taken by the flight crew (failure of the
crew to move Dr. Hanson away from the smoke), and this was
contrary to the express language in Article 17.194 Article 17 is
not fault based; "the sole proper inquiry envisaged by the draft-
ers is into 'the nature of the event which caused the injury"'
rather than the care taken by the airline to avert injury. 195
188 Petitioner's Brief at 9, Husain (No. 02-1348) (quoting Saks, 470 U.S. at 405-
407).
189 See Petitioner's Brief at 9, Husain (No. 02-1348).
190 Id. at 15.
191 See Petitioner's Brief at 10, Husain (No. 02-1348). The relevant provisions
of the Warsaw Convention concerning liability are Article 17, 20, and 21(1). See id.
at 12. Article 20 states: "[a] carrier shall not be liable if he proves that he and his
agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it was im-
possible for him or them to take such measures." Id. at 12. Article 21 states: "[i]f
the carrier proves that the damage was caused by or contributed to by the negli-
gence of the injured person the court may, in accordance with the provisions of its
own law, exonerate the carrier wholly or partly from his liability." Id. Article 25 is
also a relevant article which deals with willful misconduct. See id. at 9.
192 See Saks, 470 U.S. at 407.
193 See id.
194 See Petitioner's Brief at 16, Husain (No. 02-1348).
195 Petitioner's Brief at 16, Husain (No. 02-1348) (quoting Saks, 470 U.S. at
407). Interestingly enough, the respondents note that in the next sentence, the
Saks Court goes on to observe that "these inquiries may on occasion be similar ... "
Respondent's Brief at 36, Husain v. Olympic Airways, 316 F.3d 829 (9th Cir. 2002)
(No. 02-1348) (quoting Saks, 470 U.S. at 407).
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The Ninth Circuit created a new negligence-based "acci-
dent" standard that the petitioner claims improperly focuses on
reasonableness, foreseeability, and the carrier's mental state,
which is contrary to the holding in Saks.196
Neither the Convention nor Saks makes the "accident" determina-
tion contingent on perception of a risk... [t]he structure of the
Convention and Article 17 do not permit the courts to relieve the
passenger from meeting the conditions precedent to recovery
under Article 17 through an analysis of the negligence of a car-
rier's employee. 197
The Court in Saks recognized that the "accident" condition
precedent to liability required that the passenger establish an
event or happening. 198 Olympic argues that a failure to act or
an omission is not an "event or happening," and that Article 17
requires a discernable "event or happening" which causes the
inquiry.199 They support this argument by noting that all the
cases cited in Saks to support the Supreme Court's decision in-
volved affirmative acts, not failure to act.200 The cases cited by
Saks in which the accident requirement was not met involved
either an injury caused by the unique internal condition of a
passenger or an airline's failure to act.20 1 Olympic argues that
the courts that have properly followed the three tenets of Saks
have concluded that if the cause of the injury resulted from the
passenger's own internal reaction to a normal flight, there was
no accident even if the crew's negligence contributed to the ag-
gravation of the passenger's pre-existing condition. 20 2
Olympic also makes the argument that it is the function of
Congress, not the courts, to decide that domestic law alone, or
in combination with the Warsaw Convention, is inadequate. 203
196 See Petitioner's Brief at 25, Husain (No. 02-1348).
197 Id. Olympic suggests that it is unlikely that the drafters of the Convention
intended the accident determination be made through a reference to negligence.
See id. at 27.
198 See id. at 22.
199 See id. at 18.
200 See id.
201 See id. at 19.
202 See Petitioner's Brief at 21, Husain (No. 02-1348); see also Abramson v.
Japan Airlines, 739 F.2d 130 (3rd Cir. 1984); Krys v. Lufthansa German Airlines,
119 F.3d 1515 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 916.
203 See Petitioner's Brief at 19, Husain (No. 02-1348) (citing Zicherman v. Ko-
rean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217 (1995)).
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"Post-ratification adjustments.. .are appropriately made by the
treaties signatories, not the courts." 204 The Ninth Circuit also
held in Carey v. United Airlines,20 5 "[t] o the extent that such
plaintiffs are left without a remedy, no matter how egregious
the airline's conduct, that is a result of the deal struck among
the signatories to the Warsaw Convention."20 6 Saks holds that
until the Convention is changed by the signatories, it cannot be
expanded to hold carriers liable for injuries that are not caused
by accidents. 20 7
Olympic's final argument concerns the post-ratification
conduct of the contracting parties to the Warsaw Convention
from 1949 to as recently as 1999.208 This conduct confirms that
the Convention does not expand liability to include injuries
arising out of a passenger's state of health.20 9 In both 1949 and
1951, there were attempts to broaden the liability of the airlines
by replacing the word "accident" with the word "occurrence."
210
A delegate from the International Union of Aviation Insurers
stated (in response to the 1951 proposal):
It was not logical to extend this system to the case of an occur-
rence.. .air sickness would be covered and passengers could bring
action for damages if they suffered from air sickness. In such an
event, the carrier would have to prove that he had taken all neces-
sary measures to avoid the damage or that he was unable to take
such measures. To take necessary measures in the case of air
sickness would be not to have the aircraft fly if there were danger
that a passenger would be air sick. That would be the result of
the.. .proposal.211
Fifteen years later, in the Guatemala City Protocol of 1971,
there had been an attempt to substitute the word "event" for the
word "accident" under Article 17. However, the United States
204 El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, n.12 (1999).
205 Carey v. United Airlines, 255 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2001).
206 Id. at 1053; see also Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 546
(1991).
207 See Saks, 470 U.S. at 406.
208 See Petitioner's Brief at 32, Husain (No. 02-1348).
209 See id.
210 See Petitioner's Brief at 32-34, Husain (No. 02-1348).
211 Id. at 33 (quoting ICAO Legal Committee, Minutes and Documents of the
Eighth Session, Madrid, 11 September-28 September 1951, ICAO Doc. 7229-LC/
133 at 137-138 (1951)). Several other delegates, including the chairman of the
United States delegation also opposed the proposal. See id.
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has not yet ratified the Guatemala Protocol. 212 The Legal Com-
mittee of International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)'s re-
cent adoption of the Montreal Convention, 213 which is meant to
modernize and consolidate the Warsaw Convention's system of
liability, has retained the term "accident" as used in Article 17
of the Warsaw Convention of 1929.214
B. Response from Respondents
The respondents assert that Olympic has contradicting ar-
guments: while they argue that the Saks standard is controlling
in this case, they simultaneously argue that the phrase "an un-
expected or unusual event or happening" should be subject to a
narrower construction. 21 5 The respondents assert that the Saks
Court indicates just the opposite. 216 The district court and the
Ninth Circuit acted in accordance with the Saks standard be-
cause the Saks Court gave the term "accident" a "full, compre-
hensive" definition. 217
Not only does this language reach the kinds of incidental acci-
dents that cause injury to individual passengers, but it naturally
connects presumptive liability for accidents to the time that air-
lines exert control over their passengers. Moreover, Article 17
reaches accidents that involve willful misconduct, not just acci-
212 See Petitioner's Brief at 34, Husain (No. 02-1348). See also Kemper, supra
note 55. The Guatemala City Protocol was desired to amend the Warsaw Conven-
tion and was signed in Guatemala City on March 8, 1971. Auailable at http://www.
forwarderlaw.com/archive/guad.htm. The Protocol did qualify the revision by ad-
ding that the carrier would not be liable if the death or injury resulted solely from
the health of the passenger. See Kemper, supra note 55, at 535.
213 See Petitioner's Brief at 35, Husain (No. 02-1348), citing Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules for Carrier by Air, opened for signature May 28, 1999,
DCW Doc. No. 57 (ICAO). The Montreal Convention requires 30 countries to ratify
or accept the Convention before it can enter into force. See Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 5, Husain (No. 02-1348). The
United States Senate recently ratified the Convention on July 31, 2003. See Re-
spondents' Brief at 43, Husain (No. 02-1348). The new Convention will apply to
all roundtrip international travel beginning and ending in the United States or
beginning or ending in the territory of another party. See Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 5, Husain (No. 02-1348). The
Convention will also apply to one-way travel between the parties to the Conven-
tion. See id.
214 See Petitioner's Brief at 35, Husain (No. 02-1348).
215 See Respondents' Brief at 19-20, Husain (No. 02-1348).
216 See id. at 20.
217 See id. at 9-10.
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dents that involve inadvertence. The term "accident" thus ap-
pears to encompass... a wide range of unusual occurrences with
respect to physical operation of the aircraft and the conduct of air-
line personnel. 218
Although the Saks Court added the limitation that the injury
cannot result from the passenger's own internal reaction to the
usual, normal and expected operation of the aircraft, the Court
qualified that limitation by cautioning that the definition
should be "flexibly applied after assessment of all the circum-
stances surrounding a passenger's injuries. '219 The respon-
dents assert that Olympic ignores this admonition and instead
takes a very narrow view of what, "all the circumstances"
are.220 For example, Olympic argued that the presence of
smoke in the cabin was "normal."221 By isolating each individ-
ual circumstance, they fail to recognize that the combination of
circumstances was not "normal."222 "The refusal of the flight
crew to adhere to its usual policy and practices is a prime exam-
ple of an 'unusual' occurrence... [ulnder no circumstances can
the violation of industry standards be considered 'the usual,
normal, and expected operation of the aircraft."223 Collectively,
the events on the Olympic flight are quite different from the
"usual, normal, and expected operation of the aircraft."224
Respondents also rebut the Olympic argument that an
omission, as opposed to an affirmative act, is never an "acci-
dent."225 Respondents contend that this "bright line" between
218 Id. at 9.
219 Saks, 470 U.S. at 405.
220 See Respondents' Brief at 28, Husain (No. 02-1348).
221 See id. at 27.
222 See id. at 28.
223 Respondents' Brief at 26, Husain (No. 02-1348) (citing Saks, 470 U.S. at
406). The United States in their brief supporting the respondents make a compari-
son, "a flight attendant's response to a passenger's illness, like a pilot's response to
severe weather or an equipment malfunction, is part of the 'operation of the air-
craft.'" Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at
15, Husain (No. 02-1348) (citing Saks, 470 U.S. at 406).
224 See Respondents' Brief at 21, Husain (No. 02-1348) (citing Saks, 470 U.S. at
406).
225 See Respondents' Brief at 30, Husain (No. 02-1348) (citing Saks, 470 U.S.
at 406).
The fallacy of the position that an "accident" under the Warsaw Conven-
tion cannot take the form of inaction is demonstrated by a hypothetical
situation posited by the court in McCaskey v. Continental Airlines, Inc.,
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an accident and an omission makes little sense.226 What hap-
pens on a flight can be characterized either as an act or an omis-
sion.2 2 7  The respondents argue that these impractical
distinctions also miss the basic point established in Saks.228
The central inquiry to determine if there was an "accident" is
whether something unusual happened, not the specific form it
took. 229 Respondents also contend that even if the two can be
distinguished, the flight crew's deviation from their normal pol-
icy is still "unusual."230 The Court in Saks made it clear that an
"accident" can contain both usual and unusual elements. 231 The
Court stressed that "any injury is the product of a chain of
causes, and we require only that the passenger be able to prove
that some link in the chain was an unusual or unexpected event
external to the passenger."23 2 It is enough that the unusual
event was a contributing factor in the injury or death. 233
159 F. Supp. 2d 562 574 (S.D. Tex. 2001). Suppose, said the court, that "a
passenger inexplicably collapsed and ceased breathing through no initial
accident," and "a medical doctor informs the crew that the passenger's life
could be saved, but only if the flight landed within one hour." If, the court
continued, "the plane is within thirty minutes of a suitable airport, but
the crew blithely elects to continue on a planned cross-country flight," the
notion that this is not an unusual event is staggering.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 18,
Husain v. Olympic Airways, 316 F.3d 829 (9th Cir. 2002) (No. 02-1348) (quoting
McCaskey v. Continental Airlines, 159 F. Supp. 2d 562, 574 (S.D. Tex. 2001)).
226 See Respondents' Brief at 30, Husain (No. 02-1348).
227 See id. In Husain, depending on how the events are described, they can
either be seen as a refusal to seat Dr. Hanson in a different seat (failure to act in
accordance with standard policy), or an insistence that he remain where he was
seated (affirmative act). See id.
228 See id.
229 See Respondents' Brief at 30, Husain (No. 02-1348). The respondents argue
that such a distinction would lead to bizarre results. See id. at 31. For example, if
a passenger took another seat without permission, and was ordered to return to
his seat, despite an allergy to smoke, the order would be an affirmative act. See id.
However, the effects of that affirmative act would be the same as there are in this
case: Olympic would still be violating policy, and the passenger would still be
forced to sit amidst dangerous smoke. See id. It is irrational to think that Olympic
should be liable in the hypothetical case, but not in this case. See id.
230 See Respondents' Brief at 11, Husain (No. 02-1348). "The definition [of ac-
cident] is plainly broad enough to encompass the exposure of a passenger to dan-
gerous conditions as a result of repeated refusals by a flight attendant to follow the
regular industry and company practice." Id. at 14.
231 See id. at 20.
232 Saks, 470 U.S. at 406.
233 See Respondents' Brief at 20, Husain (No. 02-1348).
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Olympic places great weight on the fact that Dr. Hanson
had a pre-existing allergy to smoke, and they argue that one of
the tenets in Saks precludes a passenger from using his inter-
nal reaction to the normal operation of the aircraft as a justifi-
cation for claiming an accident. 23 4 However, the respondents
argue that the decision in Saks makes it clear that a passen-
ger's pre-existing medical condition does not automatically
render a finding of an "accident" impossible. 23 5 There must be
two separate determinations of whether there was: (1) "an in-
ternal reaction;" and (2) "the usual, normal, and expected opera-
tion of the aircraft."236 "Nothing in Saks says that an 'internal
reaction,' by itself, precludes recovery, even when the reaction
was directly caused by the unusual operation of the flight (an
'external' event)." 237
The respondents rebuff the Olympic argument that Article
17 is not fault-based. 238 When interpreting a treaty, it must be
interpreted as a whole.239 The Warsaw Convention is a fault-
based system.240 "[Ilt would be highly unnatural to adopt a def-
inition of the term 'accident' that, as a practical matter, would
allow carriers to escape liability for deaths and injuries caused
by their own misconduct. Nothing in the Convention calls for
that kind of illogical construction."24 1 Although Article 17 does
not require a showing of fault, its purpose is to introduce a wide
234 See id. at 37.
235 See id.
236 Id.
237 Respondents' Brief at 37, Husain (No. 02-1348). The respondents argue
that the contrary would lead to absurd results. See id. at 37. For example, the
contrary would allow Olympic to avoid liability for Dr. Hanson's death even if they
had ordered Dr. Hanson to sit in the smoking section of the plane or had caused
the asthma attack by setting off a fire in the plane. See id. at 38. Even though a
passenger without a pre-existing medical condition might escape injury or death
under these circumstances, something "unusual" and "unexpected" still occurred
during flight to cause those injuries. See id. Once this has been established, Arti-
cle 17 cannot be used as a barrier against passengers on the basis of their prior
medical histories. See id.
238 See Respondents' Brief at 22, Husain (No. 02-1348).
239 See Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 397 (1985).
240 See Respondents' Brief at 22, Husain (No. 02-1348) (citing Lowenfeld &
Mendelsohn, supra note 28, at 498-501.). The Convention "retained the principle
of liability on the basis of negligence." Id. at 500; see also Weigand, supra note 32,
at 920 ("[The Convention was originally based on fault concepts and set forth a
system of liability.").
241 Respondents' Brief at 22, Husain (No. 02-1348).
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variety of passenger claims for "accidents" involving death or
bodily injury.242 It serves to screen out cases in which there is
no question of fault because nothing unusual has occurred. 243
The ultimate questions of liability will be resolved under the
standards of Article 20 (due care), Article 21 (contributory negli-
gence) and Article 25 (willful misconduct).244 Contrary to what
the Convention appears to contemplate in Article 20, if Olympic
prevailed the result would shield them from liability for a death
caused by its failure to act with due care.245
Finally, respondents rebut the Olympic argument that the
post-ratification history did not intend to expand liability to in-
clude injuries arising out of a passenger's state of health.246
The Guatemala Protocol contends that carriers should not be
liable for injuries or deaths resulting solely from the condition
of health of the passenger.247 However, the district court and
Ninth Circuit did not find that Olympic is liable solely on the
basis of Dr. Hanson's asthma; instead they are basing liability
on the failure of the flight crew to conform to airline policy.248
Post-ratification history indicates a trend towards increasing
air carrier liability for deaths or injuries caused by fault.249
There is a growing consensus that airlines should be held liable
in the event of "unusual" occurrences. 250 "Because the Conven-
tion is a fault-based system, the reasonable working assump-
242 See id. at 23.
243 See id. at 24.
244 See Respondents' Brief at 24, Husain (No. 02-1348). Article 25 states:
The carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the provisions of this
Convention which exclude or limit his liability, if the damage is caused byhis willful misconduct or by such default on his part as, in accordance
with the law of the Court seized of the case, is considered to be equivalent
to willful misconduct.
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Trans-portation by Air, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 state. 3000, T.S. 876, 137
L.N.T.S. 11, reprinted in 449 U.S.C. 1502 (1998).
245 See Respondents' Brief at 41, Husain (No. 02-1348).
246 See id. at 44.
247 See id. at 45.
248 Had the flight crew moved Dr. Hanson, asthma would not have killed him.
See id.
249 See Respondents' Brief at 44, Husain (No. 02-1348). Many nations, includ-
ing the United States have repeatedly pushed for modifications to the Convention
that would impose some liability on the airlines without regard to fault. See id.
250 See id.
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tion is that carriers are liable, and should be liable, for deaths
or bodily injuries that are their fault."251
C. Husain in the Hands of the Supreme Court
The drafters of the Warsaw Convention did not define the
term accident, 252 and that was the start of the long dispute over
what "accident" actually meant.253 The Supreme Court adopted
a definition in Air France v. Saks254 based on what it believed to
be the intent of the drafters. That was supposed to be the end of
the debate. Ironically, that seemed to stir up the debate.255 Dif-
ferent circuits interpreted the Supreme Court's definition dif-
ferently, and a circuit split ensued. 256 As the cases seeking a
definition of the term "accident" under Article 17 increased,
there seemed to emerge a more liberal trend when defining the
term.257 However, some circuits still held a more restrictive
view of "accident. 258
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide for a sec-
ond time this highly controversial issue.259 In Husain, the
three biggest points at issue are (1) what constitutes an "unu-
sual and unexpected happening" that is external to the passen-
ger; (2) does a failure to act constitute an "accident;" and (3)
whether fault is relevant in determining whether an accident
exists.260 Both the petitioners and the respondents use Saks to
bolster their arguments. 261 Their interpretations of Saks are
not necessarily wrong; however, one of the two parties' interpre-
tations is contrary to that of the Supreme Court's. Although the
Supreme Court in Saks technically defined the term "accident,"
251 Respondents' Brief at 44-55, Husain (No. 02-1348).
252 See Karp, supra note 7.
253 See Id.
254 Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985).
255 See generally Weigand, supra note 32.
256 See id.
257 See Prewitt, supra note 17.
258 See Krys v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 119 F.3d 1515 (11th Cir. 1997),
cert. denied, 1998 U.S. LEXIS 916. The third circuit also follows a restrictive view
of Article 17. See generally Weigand, supra note 32.
259 See Husain, 123 S. Ct. at 2215.
260 See generally Respondents' Brief, Husain (No. 02-1348); see also generally
Petitioner's Brief, Husain (No. 02-1348).
261 See generally Respondents' Brief, Husain (No. 02-1348); see also generally
Petitioner's Brief, Husain (No. 02-1348).
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they "fail [ed] to fully clarify the scope of 'accident,' especially as
to whether there must be an unexpected or unusual aircraft
operation."262
Looking closely at the circumstances surrounding the
Husain case, the decision of the district court and the Ninth
Circuit squarely fit within the principles of the Saks decision.
Saks calls for a two-step analysis in determining whether there
was an "accident" under Article 17: (1) was there an internal
reaction? and (2) were there any unusual and unexpected hap-
penings that were outside the normal operation of the air-
craft?263 A finding that Dr. Hanson had a pre-existing medical
condition does not preclude a finding that there was an "acci-
dent."264 The failure of the flight crew to follow routine prac-
tices was "unusual"265 and thus was outside the normal
operation of the aircraft. This deviation from standard practice
was "external" to Dr. Hanson because, but for the conduct of the
flight crew, he would not have suffered the fatal attack. 266 After
"flexibly applying all the circumstances," as the Saks Court re-
quires,267 there is not much doubt that they add up to an "acci-
dent" under Article 17.
The Supreme Court, in February 2004, in an unprece-
dented short decision affirmed the Ninth Circuit in holding that
an Article 17 "accident" had occurred in the Hussain case. 268
The decision was concise and concrete. The Court upheld the
ruling in Air France v. Saks269 and disseminated the ruling to
apply the analysis in Saks directly to the Husain case. The defi-
nition of the term "accident" was clearly defined in Saks as an
"unexpected or unusual event that is external to the passen-
ger. '270 The parties in the Husain case do not dispute this defi-
262 Weigand, supra note 32, at 966.
263 See Respondents' Brief at 37, Husain (No. 02-1348).
264 See id.
265 See id.
266 1 suggest that a true "internal reaction" would occur solely because of the
pre-existing condition regardless of the air crew's conduct.
267 Saks, 470 U.S. at 392.
268 See Olympic Airways v. Husain, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 1620 (2004). The Su-
preme Court heard oral arguments on November 12, 2003. For a transcript of the
oral arguments, see http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argument_
transcripts/02-1348.pdf.
269 Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985).
270 Id. at 405.
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nition; however, they do disagree about which event should be
the focus of the "accident" analysis.
2 71
The Court quickly dismissed Olympic Airways' contention
that the flight attendant conduct was irrelevant because the
ambient cigarette smoke was the only injury-producing event,
which was a normal condition of the aircraft.27 2 They relied on
their Saks recognition that "any injury is the product of a chain
of causes and thus, for purpose of the 'accident' inquiry, a plain-
tiff need only prove that 'some link in the chain was an unusual
or unexpected event external to the passenger."' 273 The Court
pointed out that Olympics focus on the smoke ignores the real-
ity that many interrelated factors can combine to produce an
injury, and any one of these events may be a link in the chain of
causes and could constitute an Article 17 "accident" as long as it
was unusual or unexpected. 274 They further opined that the
district court and the Ninth Circuit were correct in holding that
the refusal by the flight attendant after express requests for as-
sistance and a seat change was an "unusual and unexpected"
event that was external to the passenger.2 7 5 Although the am-
bient smoke, which was a normal occurrence, was a link in the
chain of causation, so was the flight attendant's refusal, which
was unexpected and external to the passenger, and thus, under
Saks qualifies as an "accident." The Court further strengthened
their point by addressing the fact that although the Ninth Cir-
cuit focused on a negligence-based "accident" standard, neither
party actually disputed that the flight attendant's conduct was
"unexpected and unusual," which is the operative language and
correct Article 17 analysis.
2 7 6
271 See Husain, 2004 U.S. LEXIS at 1226, 1.
272 See id. at 1227-1228.
273 See id. (citation omitted) (1227).
274 See Husain, 2004 U.S. LEXIS at 1 (1228).
275 See Husain, 2004 U.S. LEXIS at 2 (1227).
276 See id. Olympic Airways also argues that the flight attendant's conduct
was considered a non-action, and under Saks only affirmative acts are "events" for
purposes of Article 17. See id. at. The Court quickly dismisses this argument, and
states that the Warsaw Convention does not suggest a distinction between action
and inaction on the ultimate issue of liability. See id. at 1229. However, the dis-
sent by Justice Scalia and O'Connor focused on this point. See Husain, 2004 U.S.
LEXIS at 1231. They insisted that inaction cannot be classified as an accident
because inaction is the antithesis of an accident. See id. They further opined,
"when interpreting a treaty, we accord the judgments of our sister signatories 'con-
siderable weight."' Id. (citation omitted). The dissent firmly stated that the Court
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VI. CONCLUSION
It is reasonable that the drafters' intended the Convention
to be flexible in its interpretation in order to keep with the
changing times. 277 In the 1920's, civil aviation was still in its
infancy.278 "Traveling by air was an adventure"279 In 1929, the
fatality rate with regard to flying was drastically higher than it
is today. The airplane was not generally recognized as a safe
and competent way to travel. Article 17 was conceived as a bal-
ance between the development of the air industry and the pro-
tection of passengers who might suffer injuries during their
travels. 280 Although there was a "balance" between interests,
in 1929 the scale weighed heavily toward promoting the growth
of the airline industry by limiting airline liability for death orinjuries. 28 1 Without the limitation on liability, growth of the
airline industry may have been greatly hindered.
Today the scales are heavily weighed in favor of the inter-
est of protecting passengers from injuries. Air travel is now
often the preferred way to travel. Armed with greater knowl-
edge and with the advent of technology, airline deaths and inju-
ries have greatly decreased. Many people spend a majority of
their lives on an airplane. Airline passengers are dependent on
their carrier for their safety, health, and comfort while on
board, and they place their well-being in the hands of the air-
line. 28 2 The passengers depend on the air flight crew for a num-
ber of things including the pilot correctly flying the plane, the
purity of oxygen they breathe, the acceptable behavior of the
should look to decisions of other signatories when interpreting a treaty. See id. at1232. While previous Warsaw Convention cases have carefully considered foreign
case law, Justice Scalia was quick to point out that the majority's decision in this
case is "squarely at odds" with appellate court holdings in England and Australia.See id. at 1231. Lastly, Scalia and O'Connor stated that if the flight attendant
affirmatively misrepresented that the plane was full, a cause of action might liebecause the misrepresentation, independent of the failure to reseat him, may havebeen an "unusual and unexpected" link in the chain of causes. See Husain, 2004
U.S. LEXIS at 1235.
277 See Weigand, supra note 32, at 967.
278 See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 28.
279 Grems, supra note 2, at n.1.
280 See Karp, supra note 7, at 1567.
281 See Grems, supra note 2.
282 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents
at 23, Husain (No. 02-1348).
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other passengers, proper air pressure, etc. 28 3 The airlines exert
control over our lives for the time period that passengers are on
board their plane. It is essential that the flight crew follow pol-
icy to take care of their passengers. 28 4 A passenger who be-
comes sick during a flight has good reason to expect a flight
crewmember to come to his/her assistance. 285 If the flight crew
responds in an "unusual" or "unexpected" manner, and thus
contributes to the injury or death of a passenger, the airline
could be held accountable for an "accident" under the Warsaw
Convention. 2
6
Critics concerned with the Husain Court's expansion of the
term "accident" contend that this decision will open the litiga-
tion floodgates. 28 7 Cornett suggests that these critics fail to rec-
ognize that Husain is limited to a small class of potential
plaintiffs as it imposes strict limitations on recovery:
It is solely limited to cases where the aircraft personnel (1) are on
notice of the pre-existing condition; (2) can reasonably do some-
thing to aid in the situation that will not interfere with the nor-
mal operations of the flight; and (3) do nothing. By meeting these
elements, the carrier has become the "unexpected or unusual hap-
pening that is external to the passenger" that Saks
contemplated.288
"The airline industry is unlikely to be burdened significantly by
recognizing such occurrences to be "accidents.
2 9
If the Supreme Court had found for Olympic, relieving
them of liability despite their negligence, the danger to passen-
gers would be limitless. Essentially, this would have been a
283 See id. at 23-24.
284 See id. at 24. The flight crew's traditional role has been related to the pro-
tection of their passengers safety and health abroad the aircraft. See id. When
flight attendants were introduced in the 1930's, many airlines required that the
flight attendants be nurses - a practice that was continued until World War II
when the demand for nurses was great. See id.
285 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents
at 24, Husain (No. 02-1348).
286 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents
at 24, Husain (No. 02-1348).
287 See Cornett, supra note 14, at 169.
288 Id.
289 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents
at 24, Husain (No. 02-1348).
20041
35
PACE INT'L L. REV.
"Get out of jail free card"290 for the airlines. They would owe no
duty of care to passengers, thus there would be no need for pro-
cedures or standards. The airline industry would turn chaotic.
The passengers would have no recourse for suffering an injury
or death due to an airline's negligence. This would also be con-
trary to the structure of the Warsaw Convention. The Conven-
tion is a fault-based system.291 "The common law duty of
carriers to protect passengers who are ill or incapaci-
tated... was well established at the time that the Warsaw Con-
vention was drafted."292
To find in Husain that the airline was not liable at all for an in-
tentional act knowingly committed by its crew which resulted [in]
a passenger's death would completely rid the airline of any duty of
care to its passengers. Such a result could not have been the in-
tention of the drafters of the Warsaw Convention. 293
In affirming the Ninth Circuit's decision, the Supreme
Court sent a message to the airlines that they have a duty to act
with a reasonable level of care when dealing with the passen-
gers. Although the Court focuses on the "unexpected and unu-
sual" event analysis of Saks and avoids the Ninth Circuit's
concept of negligence- based "accident" standard, both analyses
are interrelated in a case such as this case, and yield the same
message. For example, the failure of the flight attendant to as-
sist passengers constitutes negligence, and this deviation from
industry standards by a flight crew also constitutes an "unex-
pected and unusual event," which is external to the passenger.
Thus, the "accident" based on a Saks analysis directly relates to
the negligence of the flight crew. Furthermore, had the Court
reinterpreted Saks and found in favor of Olympic Airways, the
Court would have clearly been ignoring the evolution of the air-
line industry and the important role air travel plays in present
society.
The Supreme Court's decision in Husain follows the basic
Saks principles; the basic foundation in Saks is consistent with
the intent of the drafters. However, the foundation needed to be
290 Reference to the board game 'Monopoly®,' by Parker Brothers.
291 See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 28.
292 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at
23, Husain (No. 02-1348).
293 Cornett, supra note 14, at 168.
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clearly sculpted to be consistent not only with that intent, but
also with the changing needs of society. It was time for the Su-
preme Court to bring closure to the dispute concerning what
constitutes an "accident" under Article 17. This decision was
the fair and correct decision - one that truly balances the inter-
ests of the airline industry with the interests of the passengers.
This decision will have important, far-reaching effects. The air-
line industry will have to step forward and make some neces-
sary changes. However, these changes, if instituted correctly,
can lead to a more prosperous airline industry, protecting pas-
sengers, (especially those that spend a majority of time on air-
crafts) from being injured without recourse. This was the only
logically decision.
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